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INTRODUCTION
DURING THE LAST QUARTER of the nineteenth century, Newfoundland governments
were committed to securing industrial diversification through a national economic
policy of landward development. Although individual governments varied in the
details of their policies, most aimed to open up the interior of the island to agricul-
ture, mining, and forestry development through the construction of a railway sys-
tem. While governments acknowledged the social and economic importance of the
cod and seal fisheries, most believed that these marine industries provided an inad-
equate economic basis for the colony’s growing population. Persistent downturns
in the fishing industry meant that governments grew desperate to attract new indus-
tries, and gave support and natural resource rights to industrial interests such as the
various Reid railway-related enterprises and the Harmsworth pulp and paper pro-
ject at Grand Falls. Critics of these deals occasionally suggested that industrial pro-
moters and developers enjoyed what amounted to resource “give-aways,” but the
Newfoundland government found it difficult to attract capital investment to re-
source sectors that were often marginal by international comparison.
1
Although accommodating companies’ demands for exclusive property rights
in the leasing or other grant of natural resources, governments nonetheless pro-
tected the common property rights of outport fishing people
2
to the coastal forests
that surrounded their communities. Such protection might seem surprising because
official opinion at the time, like later historiographical assessments, was that fishing
people cut timber wastefully, and often started forest fires through carelessness.
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Globally, the trend in forest management was for the state to dispossess peasants,
indigenous peoples, other noncapitalist producers, and workers of rights to the for-
ests. North American, European, and colonial forestry regimes usually conserved
woodlands for capitalist production, rather than conserving the biodiversity of the
forests for future generations. Once the destructiveness of industrial expansion be-
came apparent, governments often moved to protect forests by the establishment of
parks and other types of ecological reserves. Although often used for tourism and
sport hunting, these reserves and parks usually excluded common people from any
harvesting rights.
4
Such dispossession was not the case in outport Newfoundland
during the first half of the twentieth century.
Industrial forestry promoters demanded secure private property rights to tim-
ber as a condition of development. Newfoundland governments were happy to
oblige, but without challenging the common property rights to the woods enjoyed
by outport fishing people. Ideally, the alienation of forests into private hands
should not have been difficult because, like most terrestrial resources, woodlands
are relatively easy to enclose. However, the custom of the commons among outport
people rested on their use of fish and other marine resources that were almost im-
possible to enclose. Over time, many fishers had accepted the importance of regu-
lating access to common property marine resources. Time and again during the late
nineteenth century, fishing people asked governments to regulate access to fisher-
ies, fearing that the capitalization and intensification of effort were depleting fish
stocks. Their struggle to survive in a cold-ocean coastal ecosystem meant that they
accepted the principle that no one had a right to enclose or exhaust a resource in a
manner that jeopardized the ability of another’s household to survive, or the ability
of the community to reproduce itself over time.
5
The importance of common prop-
erty rights among outport people extended from the sea to land, limiting the extent
to which governments could satisfy the demands of forestry developers. Fishing
people cut wood to build their boats, schooners, fish flakes, stages, and homes, or
for use as fuel; they considered access to forest resources a common right with
which industrial enterprises should not interfere. Throughout the late nineteenth
century, fishing people protested and lobbied against government attempts to en-
close forests, consistently pointing out that commercial over-cutting, industrial
sources of forest fires, and the improper disposal of waste were the greatest threats
to woodlands.
6
At the turn of the century, popular pressure forced the government to recognize
fishing people’s common property rights in the woods by preserving from indus-
trial exploitation all coastal forests within three miles of the high tidewater mark.
This three-mile limit, or “fishermen’s reserve” as it became known, formally be-
came part of Newfoundland’s forestry regime in 1898. Through the first two de-
cades of the twentieth century, fishing people resisted industrial access to the
reserve, and William Coaker’s Fishermen’s Protective Union [FPU] took up their
cause. Resistance became difficult to sustain as slumping post-World War I fish
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markets increased rural poverty and the need for alternative employment. Some
outport people began to establish sawmills on the three-mile limit with state sup-
port, but they faced opposition from their neighbours. This opposition helped to
sustain government support for the three-mile limit, but by the 1940s commercial
sawmilling on the reserve had become an accepted practice.
THE THREE-MILE LIMIT
The Newfoundland government turned to industrial diversification through for-
estry development in the 1870s for a number of reasons. From the 1830s to the
1860s, attempts to diversify the economy through agricultural development had
proved disappointing because of the limits imposed by a cold-ocean coastal ecol-
ogy. A revival in the fishery between 1869 and 1874 distracted the government
from diversification, but the return of poor conditions from 1875 to the end of the
century prompted railway expansion into the interior forests.
7
Crown lands acts be-
tween 1844 and 1884, in conjunction with relief roadwork, provided for the alien-
ation of land as private property for agriculture, sawmilling, and railway expansion.
The legislation did not recognize common property rights to coastal woods adja-
cent to communities. The 1860 Act, for example, provided for settlement grants
along coastlines, limiting the frontage to 200 yards. Section VII of the 1875 Crown
Lands Act provided that the government “may reserve and set apart any ungranted
Lands for fishing and other purposes whatsoever, as may be deemed expedient, and
Law to the contrary notwithstanding.” This provision disappeared in the legislation
of 1884, which consolidated regulations concerning the alienation of Crown land
for settlement, forestry, and mining development.
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It was the unregulated expansion of forestry on the west coast of Newfound-
land that forced the government to pay more attention to the industry. A series of
treaties beginning with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 had given the French the right
to fish between Cape St. John and Cape Ray. Diplomatic wrangling between France
and Britain, with Newfoundland stuck in the middle, meant that little effective gov-
ernment of the region existed. Nova Scotian investors established sawmills on the
west coast without permission, and without paying any fees or rents for the right to
cut and export timber. Timber harvesters eventually leased timber lots, nominally
according to Crown lands legislation, but they quickly exhausted the timber stands,
and began to encroach on their neighbours’ land, or on unleased Crown land. Saw-
mill operators further angered fishers by dumping sawdust and other refuse into
rivers and harbours. For example, there were complaints against the Humber Mill
Company for fouling Humber Sound with sawdust, since herring spawning grounds
would be disturbed. The government legislated against such dumping and, in 1875,
anxious to secure control over west coast resources, appointed George W.B. Carter
as Justice of the Peace and Collector of Timber Duties.
9
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The government was nevertheless anxious to attract investment from the
Maritimes. Between 1872 and 1875, for example, it negotiated with John A.
McCallum of Fredericton, New Brunswick, concerning a possible timber operation
on the east side of Gander Bay.
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The government did not take much action to sup-
port conservation, however, since a growing interest in economic development and
expansion of the forestry industry through railway building sidelined concerns
about forest destruction. Cutting down trees, after all, would supposedly make land
available for agricultural settlement. Some hoped that settlement, facilitated by
lumbering, would trigger industrial diversification and employ thousands of
Newfoundlanders.
11
In the meantime, the Geological Surveyor Alexander
Murray’s description of the wasteful cutting practices of Nova Scotian timber oper-
ators on the west coast showed that the behaviour of commercial sawmillers rather
than fishers produced the problem of open-access-related resource depletion. Nova
Scotians harvested trees in the Bay of Islands area, cutting without regard for qual-
ity and leaving trees unsuitable for ton timber to rot:
12
“In this way, millions upon
millions of feet of lumber are absolutely wasted, while the remainder is carried out
of the country for the benefit of those with whom it has no concern.”
13
With policies
focusing only on economic development, the government fostered a climate in
which natural resources might easily be over-exploited.
The expansion of commercial sawmilling on the northeast coast soon began to
cause environmental problems similar to those on the west coast. In 1880, for ex-
ample, the justice of the peace at Trinity complained that there were 36 commercial
sawmills in Trinity Bay, whose owners cut timber indiscriminately and dirtied local
waters. In Bonavista Bay, sawdust had fouled the Gambo River and Gambo Har-
bour. A British naval captain reported that “the salmon fishers naturally complain
that the fish have deserted the bay and that their occupation will ere long be irre-
trievably ruined.”
14
In Notre Dame Bay, fishers blamed the failure of the salmon
fishery in 1880 on pollution from the lumber industry, which they believed de-
stroyed salmon spawn in the rivers. There were also complaints about the extensive
timber limits sought by investors, such as the applications made by Twillingate na-
tive Joseph W. Phillips in 1881 for limits to feed his mill at Point Leamington. Phil-
lips wanted to control the forest from Western Arm to Northwest Arm in New Bay,
an area used by fishers to cut wood for the fishery, for fuel, and for timber to sell to
merchants. Correspondents to the Twillingate Sun argued that “lands so near the
water’s edge should not be divested of its valuable timber products or monopolised
by any one party to the detriment of scores of families in the Bay, who for years will
be dependent to a large extent upon the employment afforded during the winter sea-
son as heretofore.” Fishers wanted the government to establish a coastal forest re-
serve upon which no one could have exclusive rights to cut timber, and continued to
demand that the government enforce legislation against the pollution of salmon
rivers running through such reserves by sawdust and mill refuse.
15
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These popular demands grew as the government began negotiations for the
construction of a railway. Construction began in 1881 and continued until 1897,
drawing the colony into ever-deeper debt. The first contract went to a New York
syndicate, which undertook to build a narrow gauge railway from St. John’s to the
mining district of Hall’s Bay in return for annual subsidies, loans, tax exemptions,
and a land grant of 5,000 acres per mile. Many fishers feared that the company
might obtain exclusive rights to timber resources as partial compensation for rail-
way construction. Backers of the project argued that it would generate employment
and promote more rational use of the forests. Job creation was a strong argument,
though even the editor of the Evening Mercury (the most strident advocate of rail-
ways) worried that railway development might further the “indiscriminate felling”
already going on in parts of the colony, “the result of which must be to render our
forests comparatively valueless.”
16
Rather than limit the expansion of commercial
harvesting, proponents of the lumber industry suggested that government should
plan for reforestation, fire prevention, and selective cutting practices.
17
Planters joined Maritimers and St. John’s merchants in investing in sawmills.
For example, John Curtis, who moved to Hall’s Bay from Twillingate in 1870 to es-
tablish a sawmill, applied in 1887 with his brother Francis for rights to 43 square
miles near the Phillips operation, between Indian Brook, Hall’s Bay, and the Ex-
ploits River. A correspondent wrote to the Twillingate Sun to say that “these two
men are bent on preventing all other people from bringing any lumber out of that
part of the forest land whose right it is. I wonder sometimes when will oppression
cease? When will burdens too grievous to be borne, cease to be laid upon the poor
despised fishermen?” The writer argued that the government should not allow any
lumber operation to control too much of the forest, though sawmilling on a small
scale was a necessary supplement to the fishery. The editor agreed. Unrestrained
lumbering on the Avalon Peninsula had jeopardized local supplies, and the duty of
government was to preserve coastal forests for the fishery.
18
Advocates of forest conservation were often caught between their desire to see
economic development proceed by railway development and industrial diversifica-
tion, and the need to protect the resource rights of fishers, who had a clearer interest
in conservation. Notre Dame Bay fishers, for example, continued to protest against
river pollution by the growing sawmilling industry and the damage done by efflu-
ent to their fishing gear. They singled out Phillips’s mill because it dumped its re-
fuse into a nearby stream.
19
These demands for regulation of the timber industry
were also a response to pressure from boosters who wanted the forests surveyed,
advertised, and leased to developers. During the late 1880s greater numbers of tim-
ber lease applications were submitted. “If this kind of thing continues much lon-
ger,” claimed an outport newspaper, “in a very few years all the principal timber
lands will be locked up from our fishermen and it will be impossible for them to ob-
tain a spar or any other kind of material that may be required for shipbuilding pur-
poses.”
20
Commentators anticipated that sawmills would lead to overcutting of
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pine stands in central Newfoundland, and they were right. Within about 30 years,
the sawmilling industry had commercially annihilated the pine stands, destroying
the basis of the island’s export trade in lumber. The industry disappeared.
21
The pressure on forest resources mounted when the government passed legis-
lation in 1890 to foster the development of a pulp and paper industry. This allowed
companies to obtain timber grants of up to 156 square miles so long as they invested
$4,000 per square mile in pulp and paper development. Fishers would still be allowed
to cut “trees or timber” for “the bona fide purposes of the fisheries, for building ves-
sels, for masts, for poles, for erecting flakes, for fencing and for firewood, and such
like purposes.”
22
Supporters argued that pulp companies would only harvest soft-
wood; all other trees would be left to fishers and other users. However, there were
fears that the proposed licensing fees would exclude all but the largest corporations
from the pulp industry, and that if leased lands were open to fishing people, there
would be conflict. New legislation would be required to “let only a part of the land
for pulp purposes, and a part so far from the coast that it will not interfere with the
fishermen.”
23
The government recognized that the Exploits, Gander, and Gambo
rivers, and the shores of Red Indian Lake in the interior, would likely be the site of
both lumber and pulp development in the near future, and thought that continental
timber shortages would encourage Canadian investment in Newfoundland.
The potential for conflict with local people also grew, however. Phillips, for ex-
ample, expanded his sawmilling operations in Gander Bay, and in 1891 posted a
notice on the Gander River stating that he would prosecute anyone who took any of
his timber floating on the river.
24
Men from Moreton’s Harbour, who went to Ex-
ploits Bay for wood as they had done for years each fall and early winter, found two
men waiting for them in 1894. They were told that a Mr. Falconburgh and a Mr.
Burt held the area as a timber limit for the sawmill at Botwoodville; either they left
the area voluntarily, or a boatload of employees would clear them away. Believing
that no grant could exclude them from the shore, the men asked “whether our sea-
board is protected for the benefit of the fisherman or not; if not, ’tis high time it
should be or in a short time the poor man going in our Bays in search of timber will
look in vain for an unoccupied spot.”
25
The government was less interested in conservation and coastal reservations
than it was in industrial development, and the press enthused about the possibility
of a pulp and paper industry. Even newspapers that had once defended common
property access to the woods supported granting pulp syndicates exclusive rights to
leased forest land.
26
Some fishers worried about the impact of forestry develop-
ment, but others wanted the employment it might generate. In 1896 the poor in
Green Bay could only get government relief by working for J.M. Jackson, a logging
contractor at Tilt Cove, to whom the government gave a timber lease and $500 to
provide supplies to fishing people. In return they cut logs from coastal woods,
which Jackson sold for profit. But in Exploits Bay, the government limited the right
of William Evans and Luke Manuel to cut timber on the Exploits River since local
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fishing people, “who for many years past have been cutting timber and building
schooners on this brook,” would find their fisheries seriously injured. The “fisher-
men, shipbuilders and carpenters” of Pilley’s Island objected to a timber lease ap-
plication for land along the South Brook, Seal Bay, Notre Dame Bay, and further
declared that they were “opposed to the granting of timber limits within 8 miles of
the sea shore.” Deepening economic crisis nonetheless meant that the government
accepted the expansion of logging as a form of able-bodied relief wherever local
people might accept it.
27
Thus pressure to preserve common rights to the woods persisted alongside the
government’s desire to alleviate relief demands by granting logging and milling
rights. For example, in 1898 the government allowed Phillips to build another mill
only on condition that his right to the stream would not be exclusive. The govern-
ment granted rights to other companies to cut pulpwood, but reserved “localities
where cutting of wood will be inimical to the welfare of the residents.” The govern-
ment did not favour the cutting of pulpwood for export, but the demand for employ-
ment offered little choice. Nonetheless, fishers at Sops Arm complained in 1898
against the Victoria Sawmills, claiming that the company was cutting on land tradi-
tionally reserved for the fishery, and that “the reservation is essential in White Bay
in the interests of the Fishermen of the Colony.”
28
The government halted cutting.
Timber rights would henceforth only be granted to logging contractors so long as
there was “no undue interference with settlers and lands from which they obtain
their customary fuel supply.”
29
The cutting of pulpwood for export was permitted from the late 1890s, but the
government saw the need for a coastal reserve and accepted that pulp was a poten-
tially valuable local manufacture. The government did its best to ensure that those
licensed to cut timber for any purpose remained inside the terms of their licences
and leases, but by 1900 the demand for pulpwood and saw logs was such that news-
paper discussions feared the total alienation of timber limits on the island. Logging
contractors and mill owners constantly tried to cut on ungranted Crown land to the
detriment of local fishing people, who complained, and forced the government to
act. For example, the government ordered James Handcock of Botwoodville to stop
cutting for a mill owner in 1901 because he was on land reserved for fishing people.
By this time, the government had made law “in the interests of the fishermen of the
country, for whom all timber within three miles of the coast is reserved, for the pur-
pose of the fishery and for firewood.”
30
The government also insisted that fishing
people had a right to cut wood for building, firewood, and the fishery on leased
land. Fishing people further complained to justices of the peace in order to force
mill owners to build well upstream and avoid fouling inshore waters.
31
The specific three-mile limit grew out of the controversial 1898 railway con-
tract between the Tory administration of Sir James Winter, and R.G. Reid, and not
from Crown lands legislation. By this contract, Reid assumed responsibility for the
operation of the railway and its associated dry dock, telegraph line, coastal steamers,
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and ferry service across the Cabot Strait in return for a land grant of 6,400 square
miles, held fee-simple.
32
This was made clear in a 1902 dispute between the govern-
ment and Benjamin Pritchett of Indian Bay, Bonavista Bay. Pritchett claimed that
the Department of Agriculture and Mines had given him the right to cut on the
three-mile limit. The government responded:
We are informed that the Officials there did not tell you it was alright for you to go
ahead cutting timber on that three mile limit. The late Government in granting the lots
to Mr. Reid made it a condition that the Government could reserve this strip of three
miles along the sea shore for the purposes of providing timber for ship-building, for
the repairs of ships and vessels, for the purposes of the fishery, and for firewood.
When the present Government therefore came into office, they found that under this
condition they could only reserve these three mile strips for such purposes. You will
notice that the reservation does not include the cutting of timber for mill purposes nor
even for the building of houses, and it is held that no one has a legal right to enter upon
these three mile limits and cut wood except for the purposes specified in the condition
made by the late Government in the grants issued to Mr. Reid.
33
The government of Robert Bond, which took office in 1900, was not happy
with the Reid contract, seeing it as a sell-out of Newfoundland interests.
34
It would
have liked to encourage mill operators such as Pritchett, but it had to recognize the
three-mile limit, and turned down applicants for timber concessions whenever they
sought access to it. In 1902, for example, the government refused a request from a
Mr. Lindberg for a timber concession in Bay d’Espoir, because it was “in receipt of
petitions against the granting of any timber land in that locality, as it is all required
for fishing purposes.” In the same year, the government refused an application from
James W. Grant for 150 square miles on the LaPoile River “as all the timber in that
locality is barely sufficient for the requirements of the people. Protests have been
received against the granting of any timber limits along that shore.”
35
Popular pres-
sure built for the protection of the three-mile limit against the Reid railway inter-
ests, and in 1904 the government responded with new legislation. This specifically
set aside coastal forests within Reid grants “for the purpose of obtaining timber or
wood for ship-building, for the repairs of ships or vessels for the use of the fishery
and for firewood,” and provided that it “shall not be lawful for the said Company to
sell, lease or use as a timber limit any such reserved lands, or to cut or permit to be
cut thereon wood or timber for any purposes other than those above-mentioned.”
36
The appetite of sawmills for all types of trees suggested to some newspaper ed-
itors that pulp mills might foster conservation, since they were interested in large
spruce trees, and left young growth as well as other species standing.
37
Sawmillers
were predatory, and often encroached on the three-mile limit because the closer to
the shore they cut and processed logs, the cheaper the transportation costs. Further-
more, by getting logs from Crown land, they could save wood on their leaseholds,
which would become more valuable over time. In 1903, the government brought
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charges against the Horwood Lumber Company for cutting on the three-mile re-
serve. Judge Conroy confirmed the existence of the limit, and held that any mill
owner caught processing wood cut on the limit could be fined for the amount
taken.
38
The same year there were complaints about four or five mills using wood
from the reserve around Jackson’s Cove, Notre Dame Bay, and others cutting on
the reserve near South West Arm, and near North West Arm, Green Bay. To add in-
sult to injury, some of these mills dumped saw dust into salmon rivers. Fishing peo-
ple made presentments to grand juries about the illegal cutting, and wrote directly
to the government. St. John’s newspapers were quick to take notice of the danger
posed to the salmon fishery by increased river pollution, but did not take up the is-
sue of cutting on the three-mile limit. Moreover, the government did not act against
small locally owned sawmills fed by logs cut on the reserve. Such mills produced
lumber for their operators’ direct use in the fisheries and for sale to other fishers,
and contributed to outport economies. Since such milling did not clearly violate the
purpose of the three-mile limit, government intervention was difficult, although
protests from fishing people against their neighbours’ mills persisted.
39
In 1899-1900, the government agreed to an exchange of timber rights over 206
square miles around Red Indian Lake between the Reids and Lewis Miller, from
Crieff, Scotland. Miller built a large sawmill at the lake, and constructed a branch
rail line to the coast. The enterprise failed, and in 1903, a syndicate known as the
Newfoundland Timber Estates Company acquired Miller’s timber leases and mill-
ing establishments. A partnership between the Reids, the Nova Scotian forestry
promoter Harry Crowe and the American capitalist H.M. Whitney, Newfoundland
Timber Estates began the large-scale processing of white pine for lumber export.
By 1905, the company was producing 40 million, or about 62 percent, of the 65 mil-
lion board feet of lumber cut in Newfoundland, but the near exhaustion of commer-
cial supplies of lumber-quality pine led to government and commercial interest in
the pulp and paper industry. Crowe became active in promoting a pulp and paper de-
velopment that dovetailed with the interests of the Harmsworths, British newspaper
magnates, who wished to develop a secure supply of newsprint from North America.
The Harmsworths, as a condition for the establishment of the Anglo- Newfoundland De-
velopment Corporation [AND] at Grand Falls, demanded complete control over any
timber lots it might lease. The government of Sir Robert Bond was so anxious to at-
tract the AND that it agreed to remove the cap on the area a company could lease, re-
duced fees, tossed in mineral and water rights, permitted a land grant for the mill
site, freed AND from municipal taxes, and allowed other concessions on import du-
ties and property expropriation.
40
The alienation of so much forest to one concern met with opposition. The
Trade Review, long a promoter of local capital investment in forestry, decried the
grant, claiming that “in return for some development. Mr. Harmsworth is going to
shackle our liberties by sticking up trespass notices all round our lakes, and all over
our forests.”
41
The FPU was also appalled. Founded in 1908 by William Coaker, the
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FPU advocated the rights of fishing people in a wide variety of areas, including for-
est policy.
42
The Harmsworth legislation was unique in that fishing people were not
allowed to cut for fishing purposes on AND timber limits. Further, AND gained the
right to nominate the colony’s chief fire ranger in return for paying the salary. The
ranger had the authority to make any regulations he saw fit for the prevention of
fires on AND lands, and he and his deputies could detain and question anyone found
on the property. In the end the FPU grudgingly supported the Harmsworth develop-
ment as a means of alleviating poverty, but argued that there should be a tax on tim-
ber exports to ensure that Newfoundlanders benefited from the forestry industry to
the maximum extent.
The FPU also took up the cause of defending the three-mile limit against the
Harmsworths and other industrialists. Its newspaper, The Fishermen’s Advocate,
reported widespread anger about encroachments by small sawmill operators, and
the prospect of a new pulp and paper industry meant “every effort must be made to
protect the few remaining trees left on the reserves.... There is a lot of talk about pro-
tecting the timber along the railway belonging to various companies which remains
unburnt, but very little is heard from the Government about protecting the fisher-
men’s reserves from the inroads of the mills and land-loggers.” The FPU feared that
the arrival of the pulp and paper industry would seduce the government into allow-
ing leases on the three-mile reserve.
43
The Bond government enforced the limit, but
began to grant leases just beyond the reserve, primarily on the Bonavista Peninsula,
to large sawmill operations. This meant that local people who wanted to start
smaller operations faced problems, because they could not cut either on leased land
or on the limit:
There is no place left for the small mill man to lay his foot. Since the fisherman’s terri-
tory became circumscribed, the small mill man has ceased to be a ‘fisherman’, within
the meaning of the act, as it is translated by the bona fide fisherman, and he mostly cuts
his timber beyond the three-mile limit, rather than have any quarrel with his neigh-
bour. Again, in many places there was no dispute, as both cut side by side inside and
outside the three-mile limit.
44
The expansion of forest industries made some kind of conservation regime
necessary. As a result, lease holders, speculators, and forestry promoters came to-
gether in 1907 in the Newfoundland Forestry Association, patronized by the gover-
nor, with the premier, Sir Robert Bond, acting as honourary president. Joining them
were local politicians and the medical missionary and philanthropist Dr. Wilfred
Grenfell, who had begun a sawmill at Roddickton in 1903 as a relief measure. The
association’s primary object was voluntary reforestation through tree planting.
45
The FPU rejected voluntary self-management of the forests by merchants and indus-
trialists, just as it opposed the self-regulation of the fishery promoted by the Board
of Trade, founded in 1909. It expected the government to manage natural resources.
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The new People’s Party government led by Sir Edward Morris, which came to
power in 1909 with FPU support, promised legislation to benefit fishers and labour-
ers. Nevertheless, like the Bond government, it turned a blind eye to encroachments
on the reserve by small outport mill operators. This drew the ire of Coaker, who
wrote that the government “does not hear the angry growl that hourly escapes from
the fisherman’s lips, regarding the manner in which small mills and hand loggers
are everywhere destroying the little green timber remaining, which ought to serve
the purposes of fishing uses in the future.”
46
In every issue of the Advocate, Coaker
published long lists of friends of the government who received timber leases or li-
censes to cut on Crown land, including inroads on the three-mile limit. Coaker
termed these encroachments “the robbing of the heritage of the fishermen in order
to enrich a few ornaments of the machine at St. John’s.” A plank in the FPU’s newly
formed political platform was the prohibition of any logging by commercial saw-
mills or pulp mills, no matter how big or small, on the three-mile limit. Wood on the
reserves should be cut only for constructing fishing premises, vessels, and related
structures.
Coaker noted in 1911 that since 1909 it had become common for friends of the
government to build sawmills on the three-mile limit, and asked FPU members to
watch out for illegal mills and cutters so that they might be reported to the govern-
ment In 1911, FPU members presented 40 petitions to the House of Assembly de-
manding the immediate prohibition of all sawmills on the three-mile limit.
47
Particularly worrisome was the manner in which the sawmills at Botwood pur-
chased wood cut in Notre Dame Bay and Green Bay. Coaker argued that these mills
purchased more wood than they could process, and suggested that they must be
selling the excess to the plants at Grand Falls and nearby Bishop’s Falls, where Al-
bert E. Reed and Company, Ltd. had just begun to produce pulp. Such underhand-
edness, he argued, typified the corruption of the Morris government, and would
surely end the ability of fishers to get the wood they required. The defence of the
three-mile limit had become all the more important because most timber reserves
lay in the hands of “various land grabbers. Hardly a square mile remains, except the
three mile limit.” Correspondents like “Pilley’s Island” regularly wrote to claim
that “a man can scarcely get a keel for his boat without going five or six miles at the
least. Everything is cut down by greedy hands, and men have been allowed to erect
mills against the wish of the people, and nothing have [sic] been done to stop them.
But we are going to stop it now; we want the three mile limit for the fishermen.”
48
The election battle of 1913 between Morris and a Liberal-FPU alliance forced
his government to adopt legislation that might appeal to voters outside its Avalon
Peninsula stronghold. The “Act Respecting the Operation of Sawmills” permitted
“any bona fide fisherman” to operate a sawmill without fees for the purpose of mak-
ing the shingles and staves required by his fishing operations. The act further allowed
one-year licences for five dollars “to persons or companies who are at present operat-
ing mills on what is known as the three mile limit and are not the holders of timber or
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pulp licences under the Crown Lands’ Act.” The minister might revoke such li-
censes “upon the application or petition of any persons who shall satisfy him by any
such evidence, or in any manner, that the grant of such license, or the operation of
such mill, is contrary to the public interest.”
49
The FPU called on its local councils to
petition against sawmills threatening the reserve, and reminded its members that
prospective mill operators had to give three months’ public notice.
50
Unfortunately for fishers and the FPU, the coming of World War I made this a
hollow victory. The government declared that the cutting and milling of timber for
pitprops on Crown land, including the three-mile limit, was a patriotic duty since
they would be used in British coal mines and, later, in the trenches. Further, it per-
mitted the export of pulpwood, which the government had prohibited in 1903, so
that British paper plants could be kept in operation. Faced with new pressure on for-
est resources, the FPU had to accept the notion that the best way to preserve the
woods was through “a study of our forests with a view to conservation, and the pos-
sibility of helping nature to restore the wealth, that our stupidity has allowed to be
destroyed.” As the war dragged on, English purchasers of pitprops offered good
money to fishers who had faced a long period of economic hardship. Throughout
Trinity Bay, Bonavista Bay, and Green Bay many fishers had “availed of the offer
to cut this timber and have cut off their right hand with their left.”
51
Although the Advocate condemned fishers who cut pitprops on the three-mile
limit, others took more practical action. In the spring of 1916, the people of
Lewisporte demanded that government prohibit once again any cutting on the
three-mile limit except for the needs of the fishery. From Twillingate the govern-
ment received a petition with over 392 signatures demanding that cutting for
pitprops or any other non-fishery-related purposes be stopped. People from eigh-
teen other small communities submitted similar petitions. The government refused,
arguing that British and French military procurers would have to pay higher prices
to holders of timber limits. The war effort, and the profits of pitprop procurement,
demanded the sacrifice of outporters’ common rights to coastal forests.
52
The long depression in the Newfoundland fishery that set in with the end of
World War I eroded Coaker’s commitment to the three-mile limit. Coaker allied his
party with Richard Squires’s Liberals in 1919, and became the Minister of Marine
and Fisheries, a post he held until 1923. As a member of government, Coaker found
that the constant demands for relief made employment through logging for small
sawmills a “necessary evil.” Pitprop cutting continued to be the main form of able-
bodied relief through the 1930s. The FPU saw this work as appalling because it
meant that wood left Newfoundland relatively unprocessed rather than feeding the
local pulp and paper industry. The FPU thus became very susceptible to pulp and pa-
per promoters such as Harry Crowe, who wanted government permission to build a
mill in White Bay. He promised to harvest primarily deadfall on the three-mile limit
around Hampden and Sop’s Arm. Workers would receive good wages and live in
clean company facilities with the best medical attention available. The government
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agreed when it became clear that he had much popular support from the area, and
further asked him to provide relief to the disabled on account with the government.
In 1927, the people of Sop’s Arm even petitioned the government in support of
Crowe’s plans to expand cutting on the three-mile limit from their neighbourhood
to Jackson’s Arm.
53
The plight of the fishery meant that the FPU fully supported Crowe’s project, as
well as a new pulp and paper development on the Humber River, and a possible
third project on the Gander River.
54
While the union continued to promote fishers’
need for access to forests, the Advocate increasingly boosted Newfoundland’s “for-
est wealth,” and its potential for generating employment. The expansion of timber
cutting became accepted as depressed prices continued to plague the fishing indus-
try, with opposition being expressed only to the export of relatively unprocessed
wood for pitprops or pulp manufacture elsewhere. The whole point of the industry
was to provide as much employment as possible for outport Newfoundlanders.
Newspaper correspondents continued to support the right of fishing people to cut
wood for the fishery, and argued that while commercial operators should pay royal-
ties for cutting on Crown land, fishers should remain exempt.
55
The FPU maintained
its hostility towards the AND, which it felt was trying to monopolize timber rights in
central and northeastern Newfoundland at the expense of a third mill project. When
the government allowed the AND to buy out and close down an unfinished pulp mill
at Alexander Bay in 1925 so that its timber leases could supply the Grand Falls
complex, for example, the FPU condemned the AND as a wolfish timber speculator
and railed against the government for allowing Newfoundland’s natural resources
to fall under the company’s control.
56
The FPU was in a difficult position. It recognized that capital investment from
outside Newfoundland was necessary to accomplish greater economic diversifica-
tion, and forestry companies needed to secure wood lots if they were going to in-
vest. If the FPU was too forceful in arguing that companies such as the AND were
exhausting the forests, then it would be saying that the forests could not support ad-
ditional industry. As a result, while the FPU continued to suggest that pulp and paper
companies were not careful stewards of forest resources, it began to emphasize
more that careless use of the woods by local people accompanied the “crime” of in-
dustrial cutting. The FPU did not claim directly that fishers intentionally overcut the
forests, but did accept government and industry claims that carelessness in the
woods caused destructive forest fires.
57
The FPU had to accept outport people’s commercial exploitation of the three-
mile limit, and began to defend the reserve more as a wood lot set aside for small
sawmills than as a property held in common for the good of the fishery. Correspon-
dents to the Advocate increasingly attacked cutting on the reserve by large St.
John’s mill owners and by contractors who supplied the pulp and paper industry.
They also criticized speculators who tried to get grants on the reserves. Fishers from
Jackson’s Arm, Sop’s Arm, Brown’s Cove, and Hampden, for example, petitioned
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the government not to allow “foreign” companies to acquire such rights. Harry
Crowe had never developed his industrial complex, and by 1928 he had transferred
his White Bay holdings, including the three-mile limit, to the International Power
and Paper Company, which had recently taken control of the Humber development
based at the new pulp and paper complex at Corner Brook. The White Bay people
now asked that the “three mile limit should be exclusively reserved for the use of
fishermen,” but also “that the royalties on small mills be abolished.”
58
Fishing peo-
ple had come to depend on small-scale milling to make ends meet, and the FPU
agreed that the government should licence and inspect mills established on the
three-mile limit, but should not discriminate against small outport operators in fa-
vour of larger industrial interests:
For the small man the three-mile limit is all that is left. If he wants to make a living by
sawing a few thousand feet of lumber or cooperage stock he has, of necessity, to oper-
ate on the three-mile limit, because the land grabber has the interior timber areas of the
country tied up. It is the big operator, in most cases, who is denuding the three mile
limit of most of its timber, not the small mill men. Why not pounce on these, and limit
their operations, as well as restrict the small man. We trust the Government will not
act unfairly in this matter.
59
By 1928, the government had accepted limited industrial development on the
three-mile limit in White Bay so long as it had the clear support of local fishers, as
well as small sawmilling operations run by outport people as supplements to their
fisheries. The government began to issue licences for commercial operations on the
three-mile limit, though most sawmills on the reserve continued to be small-scale
affairs. The FPU worked to protect the right of small sawmill operators to wood
from the three-mile limit, thinking that sawmilling supplemented the fishing indus-
try much better than the pulp and paper industry. The FPU demanded that govern-
ment should protect the reserve from industrial forestry companies, and that no
such company should be allowed to acquire property there which would interfere
with common property rights. By issuing licences, the government was dispossess-
ing fishing people of their right to cut wood.
60
During the Great Depression people increasingly turned to the woods to sup-
plement their incomes, often operating barely profitable small sawmills. Govern-
ment licensing fees were an extra expense, and much resented. Outport newspaper
editors responded that licensing fees were necessary because “cutting wood can
hardly be taken as a business on like basis as the catching of fish, for the reason that
wood doesn’t move around as fish in the sea, and is of course not able to be replen-
ished so quickly as the fish on its ground.”
61
The pressure on forest resources was such that some pro-development news-
papers such as the Daily News began to suggest that the government could disre-
gard the three-mile limit since it had not been created by specific and explicit
legislation. This notion led A.B. Morine, a Conservative politician who had once
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been the Reids’ solicitor, to reiterate in 1930 that the legal basis of the limit was
sound, and lay in the 1898 railway contract. The government had expressly forbid-
den any enclosure of the three-mile limit so that it would remain a common pre-
serve for fishing people, and he held that the reserve should always be maintained
for that purpose.
62
The same year the government passed new legislation which did
not cancel existing licences, but stated that new ones could not “be granted on lands
situated within three miles of tidal waters.”
63
However, logging contractors continued to cut on the reserve, supplying wood
to the pulp and paper companies, and the government condoned the practice be-
cause it wanted fishing people to draw income from logging rather than public re-
lief. Occasionally, though, the government confronted a contractor after com-
plaints from people living close to the area being cut. In 1931, for example, J.A.
McLellan defended his cutting on the three-mile reserve at St. George’s, on the
west coast, stating that he thought that International Power and Paper had secured
cutting rights to the area. J.F. Downey, the Minister of Mines and Agriculture,
asked McLellan to stop; he replied that his logging crew had no other means to earn
a bag of flour. “The men have asked me to write you and to plead on their behalf, as
well as my own,” claimed McLellan. He wanted the right to sell the timber already
cut, and for the government to find him a legal place to continue working. Downey
refused, largely because McLellan was a licensed Deputy Crown Lands Surveyor
who should not have been abusing his office by cutting illegally.
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Encroachments on the three-mile limit were difficult to contain, and pressure
on the reserve alarmed the government. It drew up a map showing where, by the
Reid contract of 1898, people “could cut material for fuel, fencing and fishery pur-
poses, but on no condition for saw logs.” The minister claimed that this was neces-
sary because of the “covetousness” of sawmillers such as E. Bishop of Stephenville
Crossing, who logged on the Port au Port Peninsula. Downey claimed that Bishop
had “been resorting to every possible means of getting logs from private properties
and from the Three Mile Limit. We have proof in this Department of his writing and
getting people to write for permission to cut quantities of lumber to build houses,
and this is done, with the view of having the lumber handed over to Bishop, he pay-
ing them, of course, a certain price therefor.” The Minister blamed mill operators
for taking advantage of the wretched economic circumstances of the people. Places
close by the big mills “will be made absolutely uninhabitable if these reservations
made in the interest of the public are allowed to be sacrificed to the greed of Bishop,
and the half dozen other people operating sawmills who sell the cut of their mills to
Bishop.”
65
By 1933, deepening economic crisis had forced the government to allow
“wood-for-coal” deals that circumvented the policy of not allowing the export of
pulpwood. The government also needed to issue as many sawmill licences as possi-
ble to generate income. The increased export of unprocessed wood alarmed the
chief surveyor, who warned the government “that at the present time we are draw-
Coastal Forests 223
ing upon our wood reserves to the ‘utmost limit’.” He recommended strict cutting
limits on Crown lands, and a limit on wood exports of no more than 50,000 cords
per year.
66
The FPU agreed that something had to be done. The three-mile limit had
to be protected as it had become “practically denuded of timber for fishery purposes
all around the Island and only in a few sections are there any worthwhile stands of
timber left suitable for schooner building, boat building, flake material, and sound
firewood. There must be a halt to cutting pit props or pulp wood on such areas very
soon.”
67
The FPU nonetheless wanted some form of relief work for fishing people,
and advocated that government open up leases held by speculators. This suggestion
was unacceptable to a government that was anxious to secure new investment in in-
dustrial development. The government instead took the position that the three-mile
limit was really the best place to cut because “with the bulk of wood along our
shores, and the unlimited number of young trees springing up, it is hardly possible
to cut out the country in a few years.... The decline in the fishery lessens the demand
for the use of timber and all the revenue possible from licenses will help all the more
the country’s finances.”
68
Fees from sawmills could not save Newfoundland from the financial catastro-
phe and scandals that had been accelerating since the late 1920s.
69
In 1934 responsi-
ble government was suspended and a British-appointed commission took over. The
royal commission which preceded this decision heard many stories about poor gov-
ernment management of natural resources. W. Walsh, the Minister of Agriculture
and Mines, said that the pulp and paper companies were responsible for the govern-
ment not caring properly for timber on Crown lands; they put additional pressure on
the three-mile reserve by availing “of the period of depression to encourage ... in-
discriminate cutting of pulpwoods ..., which they purchase from settlers, thus con-
serving the timber supply on their own limits.”
70
The Commission of Government recognized that such practices had under-
mined the popular will to protect the three-mile reserve. Like the responsible gov-
ernment it replaced, the Commission allowed cutting permits on the reserve as a
form of public relief in Bonavista Bay.
71
Not every fishing community accepted
this relief plan: the people living between Comfort Cove and Loon Bay in Notre
Dame Bay protested against a contract to cut pitprops in their area in 1935. They ar-
gued that logging contractors should cut inland, and that the three-mile limit should
be preserved.
72
The Commission saw small-scale sawmilling and logging opera-
tions as wasteful and inefficient. It established a park, forestry nursery, and demon-
stration sawmilling and logging operations along the Salmonier Line on the Avalon
Peninsula, but otherwise tended to defer to what it saw as the modern, efficient for-
est management of the big pulp and paper companies, and often turned to them
rather than its own Department of Natural Resources for information.
73
In 1937, the Commission halted indiscriminate cutting for export as a relief
measure. It ironically singled out wood lots held by the pulp and paper industry for
praise, arguing that wood harvesting on these lots had taken into account the need
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for conservation. It ignored the manner in which the companies had used wood cut
outside their leases, and had acquired most of the timber limits held by large saw-
mill operators, who subsequently shut down their operations. Small-scale sawmills
operated by outport people thus began to satisfy the local demand for lumber. Ev-
erywhere “Water Mills, Gasoline Mills and small Steam Mills” sprung up, all fed
by wood from the three-mile limit and other Crown land, as people struggled to sur-
vive the Depression.
74
Rather than accept that a long economic depression and government policy
had led to so much logging and milling on the three-mile reserve, the Commission
argued that the reserve was a model of mismanagement as a result of fishing people
cutting without long-term planning in mind. The FPU agreed that the three-mile
limit was in jeopardy, as were the forests generally, but it continued to argue that the
main threat was unrestrained commercial exploitation for export, encouraged by
the Commission’s flawed relief programs. The union further rejected the notion
that small-scale mill operators and loggers practised unsound cutting. The Advo-
cate suggested that fishing people were much more likely to cut selectively, using
older growth for building purposes and diseased growth for firewood.
75
In 1939, the spread of commercial logging to the three-mile reserve prompted
the Commission of Government to develop a new forest policy, since a scarcity of
timber in coastal areas had contributed to the decline of wood-products industries
in the outports.
76
The Commissioner of Natural Resources, Thomas Ewebank, de-
clared that there was more than enough timber on the reserve to support ordinary
cutting, but the added pressure of cutting for sawmills meant that a total allowable
cut of about 160,000 cords of wood a year must be set to preserve the forests for the
future. The Commission also terminated permits to cut pulpwood and pitprops on
Crown land. It noted that such practices, which had first begun on the Bonavista
Peninsula, had led to the almost complete deforestation of the area. Fishing people
had to travel into the interior by rail to cut firewood for the winter. The policy may
have changed, but pressure to provide employment by developing small mills did
not abate, and the government seems to have been unable to measure total allow-
able cuts.
Rather than blame commercial cutting for the deforestation of the Bonavista
Peninsula, the FPU blamed forest fires. Forest fires had indeed been a problem on
the Peninsula, and the Advocate blamed both the railway and the carelessness of
fishing people generally. By now a shadow of its former self, transformed by
Coaker’s disillusionment with democratic politics in the dying days of responsible
government and his commitment to retrenchment, and experiencing a succession
of leaders with more mercantile than labour leanings, the FPU was no longer the
champion of fishing people. The reasons for its newspaper’s position on the causes
of forest fires became clear in 1943 when the Commission further regulated the
right to cut wood on the three-mile limit on the Bonavista Peninsula. “New-
foundlanders,” claimed the editor, “have been described as ‘destructive from the
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word go’, and it is true that we are a wasteful people.... We did not have to or could
not conserve.”
77
CONCLUSION
Neither the Commission nor the FPU advocated the end of the three-mile limit,
though the union seems to have become pessimistic about the ability of fishing peo-
ple to manage wisely access to common property resources. By 1943, the FPU had
was even more committed than it had been in the 1920s to the notion that New-
foundland’s economic future lay with industrial diversification, which would de-
pend on attracting more capital. The Advocate was not about to deter such capital by
blaming industrial development for the evident depletion of woodlands by forest
fires and overcutting. Furthermore, by 1943 the FPU had come to believe that few
fishers actually depended on common rights to coastal forests for their fishing ac-
tivities. There is, however, little evidence to support the FPU newspaper’s notion
that fishing people misused their common right of access to the woods. The history
of the three-mile limit suggests the opposite view. Throughout the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, fishing people had demanded protection from the problems
related to the growth of industrial forestry. At first, they were most concerned about
the pollution of fishing waters by sawmills. Additional concerns grew quickly
about the way in which industrial interests wanted to enclose more and more of
Newfoundland’s forests as private wood lots. Even more troubling was the evident
desire of governments to accommodate such industrial interests in the pursuit of
economic diversification.
Fishers’ protests in defence of their common right of access to the woods led to
the legal recognition of the three-mile limit as a coastal forest reserve in 1898. The
three-mile limit embodied the common property rights of fishing people to have ac-
cess to woodlands. Maintaining the three-mile limit had been a constant struggle
for fishing people and their champion, the FPU. The forest industry continued to
grow as the government promoted pulp and paper development. Dismayed at the
onset of severe depression, even the FPU became a promoter of the pulp and paper
industry. Many fishing people found that they had to turn to sawmilling in order to
earn a livelihood. Their increasingly commercial, if small-scale, exploitation of the
three-mile reserve continued to be opposed by other fishing people. The FPU con-
tinued to defend the three-mile reserve as common property that should be pre-
served for small-scale outport mill operations against large-scale industrial forest
enterprises. The persistence of the three-mile limit continued to serve as a reminder
of the important role common property, whether on land or sea, played in support-
ing the outport communities of Newfoundland, and of the willingness of outport
people to defend their common rights. After Confederation, provincial legislation
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recognized the three-mile limit, and rights of common access persisted until the
province reorganized Crown lands in the late 1970s.
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